Contemp orury Philosophy in Scandinavia Edited b1 Ralmond, E. Olson and, Anthon^t, M. Paul v/ Introduction bl G, H, uon Wright Reprinted from THE IOHNS HOPKINS PRESS Balt imore and London Copyright @ tg'tz by The Johns Hopkins Press Manufactured in the United States of America Lars Bergstrtim Meaning a,nd, Morals I Moral philosophers are sometimes concerned with moral problems. (This might not come as a surprise to anyone.) But they have also displayed a great interest in problems about the meaning of those words that are typical ly used to express answers to moral problems (e.g., "r ight," "good,," "ought," and so on). Problems of the latter kind may doubtless be of some importance, but i t is not entirelv obvious how they are related to those of the former kind. In part icular, i t mav be wondered whether any moral conclusions can be inferred from a definit ion of an ethical term. Do such definit ions contain or entai l moral principlesl This is the quesrion that I propose to discuss here. I t is not the only question that can be asked about the relat ion between meaning and morals, but i t appears to be a rather fundamental one. Moreover, my own answer to i t is dif ferent from that which seems to be taken for granted by several prominent moral phi losophers. I-et me f irst n-rention some typical definit ions of ethical terms. I t might be suggested. for example, that "good" means "pleasant" or "desired upon ref lect ion"; that "r ight" means "approved by me (the speaker)" or "commanded by God"; and that "ought to be done" means "has intr insical ly better consequences than every alternative." Some definit ions of this kind may be more acceptable than others, but this is not something that I want to discuss here. Neither need we bother about the dist inct ion between natural ist ic and non-natural ist ic definit ions. For the purposes of this paper we may concentrate on the fol lou' ing example: ( l ) "Right" means the same as "general ly approved." Other definit ions may be treated by implication. The question that I \ \ 'ant to Dr. Bersstr i i rn, of thc Universi t r of Stockh6lm, is a nat ivc 6f Swct lcn 185 186 Lars Bergstrdm discuss, then, is whether i t is possible to derive any moral conclusion from ( 1). In part icular, does ( 1) contain or entai l (2) I f an action is general ly approved, then i t is r ight, or some similar principlel In other words, is (2) a logical consequence of ( l) l This may appear to be a rather elementary question. Nevertheless, i t seems to me that it needs to be answered. It should be noticed that we do not have to pay any explicit artenrion ro possible inferences which involve more than one premise but which are otherwise similar to the step from (1) to (2). For example, the inference (3) "Right" means the same as "general ly approved," This action is general ly approved, Therefore, this action is right, presents no special problem. It seems clear that (3) is val id i f , and only i f , (2) is a consequence of (1). This presumably is not at al l controversial. But is (2) a logical consequence of (1) I This may seem more doubtful. L According to the logical intuitions of many non-philosophers it would presumably be fair ly obvious that (2) fo l lows from ( l ) .Many people would probably say that one has ro accept (2) i f one acceprr ( l) . On the other hand, some phi losophers might object to this by saying that such an inference would violate Hume's thesis that one cannot derive an ought from an is. But this argument seems to beg the question. Besides, i t is not selfevident that the step from (1) to (2) is a srep from is to ought. I t does not seem unreasonable to suppose that someone might hold that (2) is factual or that (1) is normative. In part icular, i t might be argued that ( l) is normative i f i t contains or entai ls (2); or that (2) is not normarive i f i t fol lows from (l) . So Hume's thesis does not seem to be of much help here. Some philosophers might wish to say that (2) cannot follow logically from anything at al l since i t is neither true nor false. By the same token i t might be maintained that (3) is a so-cal led practical inference and that such inferences are ne\rer logical ly val id. However, the thesis that something cannor be logical ly related to something else unless i t is true or false is very far from being general ly accepted. Many vu'r i ters, including myself, l have argued that i t should be rejected. Moreover, i t may be doubted that (2) and the conclusion of (3) are neirher rrue nor false. I t might be held, for example, that (2) is analyt ic and, hence (tr ivial ly), true i f (1) is true. I t might even be argued that (2) fol lows from (1) for this very reason. l See my studv Imperatiue.r and Ethics (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 1962), pp. t L- '+ z. Meaning and Morals 187 The arguments which have been indicated above may be questioned. However, i t is surely reasonable to surmise that many phi losophers would in fact refuse to agree that (2) fol lows from (1). On the other hand, i t also seems that several prominent phi losophers are incl ined to take the opposite view. For example, G. E. Moore writes: It seems sometines to be vaguely held that when a man judges an action to be right, he is merely judging that he has a part icular feel ing towards i t , but that yet, though he real ly has this feel ing, the action is not necessari ly real ly r ight. But obviously this is impossible. I f the uhole of what we mean to assert, when we say that an action is r ight, is merely that u'e have a part icular feel ing towards i t , then plainly, provided' only we really have this feeling, the action must really be right.2 A few pages later he says: No one, I think, would be very much tempted to assert hat the mere presence (or absence) of a certain feeling is invariably a sign of rightness, but for the supposition that, in some way or other, the only possible meaning of the word "right," as applied to actions, is that son-rebody has a certain feeling towards them.3 Hence, i t seems that Moore would accept the view that i f "r ight" means "approved (by X)," then a given action is r ight i f i t is in fact approved (by X). This is perhaps even more obvious from the fol lowing passage: Thus, i f , when 1 assert an action to be r ight, I am merely assert ing that i t is general ly approved in the society to which 1 belong, i t fol lows, of course, that i f i t rs generally approvecl by my society, my assertion is true, and the action really is right.a I conclude, therefore, that i t may reasonably be assumed that Moore would regard (2) as a logical consequence of ( l ) . Now it has been pointed out by C. L. Stevensont hat some of Moore's arguments are inconclusive. In part icular, Stevenson shows that the definit ion (4) "X is r ight" has the same meaning as " l approve of X." does not enti t le one to accept (5) l f "X is r ight ," said by ,4, is t rue, then X is r ight .6 But i t should be noticed that Stevenson's cri t ic ism applies only to the part icular inference of (5) from (4). Stevenson does not question the general assumption, which seems to be implici t in Moore's arguments, that principles l ike (2) and (5) may fol low from definit ions. As a matter of fact, he seems to hold that the definit ion 2 (1. E. Moore, l l th ics ( l ,on<lon: The Homc Universi t l ' L ibrar l ' , 1912), pp.92-93. 3lhid. , p. 106. 4Ihid. , p. l0t t . 5 C. L. Stcvcnson, "Moorc 's Argumcnts against Certain Forms of Ethical Natural isni ," tn The Phi losophy ol G. E. Moore, ecl . P. A. Schi lpp (Evanston and Chicago: Northu'cstern Universi t l ' , 1942), pp. 7 l -90. 6 lb id. . o. 76. 188 Lars Bergstrrjm (6) "X is right" has the same meaning as "somebody approves of X," does enti t le one to accept (5).? In other words, i t seems that Stevenson would maintain that although (7) If someone approves of X, then X is right is not a logical consequence of (4), i t is a logical consequence of (6). Hence, he would presumably also accept the view that (2) is a logical consequence of ( l) . A. C. Ewing appears to be another proponent of this view. For example, in cri t icizing certain natural ist ic definit ions of ethical terms Ewing claims: It is an essential feature of the moral consciousness that I realize that, if I ought to do sornething, I ought to do it whether others feel approval of it or not.8 Now he seems to hold that this moral principle is logical ly incompatible with a definit ion according to which "ought to be done" means the same as " is general ly approved." For he goes on to say, If "what ought to be done" means "what is generally approved," general approval would have to be the only factor which ult imately counted in deciding what we ought to do, and this i t certainly is not.e In other words, Ewing seems to hold that the definit ion in question entai ls an unacceptable moral conclusion, namely, that something ought to be done i f and only i f i t is general ly approved, and that the definit ion must be rejected in order to avoid this conclusion. A few pages later he seems to argue in a similar way: The view that "good" tneans "what most people desire (or like)" is open to similar objections. Most people desire and like happiness more than great virtue, yet it does not therefore necessarily follow that the former is better.lo It appears that Ewing is presupposing that this would follow if "good" meant "what most people desire (or l ike)" or i f "X is better than Y" meant "Most people desire (or l ike) X more than Y." In general, he seems to hold that (natural ist ic) definit ions of ethical terms entai l (unacceptable) moral principles. Hence, he would probably say rhar (2) is a logical consequence of ( l) . It has often been suggested that, if one accepts a naturalistic definition, then one is also committed to the view that moral or ethical problems can be solved by ordinary empir ical methods. For example, R. B. Brandt wrires: It has been suggested that " is desirable" means just " is desired by somebody." I f this proposal is r ight, then, of course, observation can tel l us what is desirable. l l 7 lb id. , pp. 76-77. 8A. c. Ewing, The Defni t ion of Good (London: Rout ledge & Kegan paur, 1947), p.62. s lbid. 10 lb id. , p. 65. 11 R. B. Branclt, Ethical rheory (Englewood cliffs, N.f.: prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 152. Meaning and Morals This view seems to involve or presuppose the assumption that naturalistic definit ions entai l moral pr inciples. I f Brandt 's argument were expressed more expl ic i t ly it would presumably run as follows. From the definition according to which "is desirable" means the same as " is desired by somebody" we may der ive the pr inciple that something is desirable i f and only i f i t is desired by somebody. Observat ion can tel l us what is desired by somebody. Hence, i f we accept the definition, we are committed to the view that observation can tell us what is desirable. Further support for th is interpretat ion of Brandt 's argument can be found in the fo l lowing passage: The reason why all problems of ethics can be solved by the methods of science, if natural ism is t rue, is that the natural ist 's def in i t ions ( l ike every def in i t ion) enable him to assert that some fundamental ethical statements are t rue by def in i t ion-statements he can use as the basic premises of h is system of normat ive ethics. For instance, Perry 's definitions enable us to say, "Any act is right if and only if it wil l contribute more to harmonious happiness than anything else the agent could do instead." The Ideal Observer def in i t ions permit us to assert , as t rue by def in i t ion, "Anything is desirable i f and only i f an informed (and so on) person would want i t to occur." In general , a definition r.r,i l l permit us to say something of the form, "Anything is E [ethical term] i f and only i f i t is a PQR." Then, s ince science presumably can tel l us what wi l l contribute most to the harmonious happiness, or what an informed person would want, and so forth, i t wi l l carry us to conclusions about what is r ight or good.12 A simi lar v iew seems to be held by W. K. Frankena. He wri tes: For example, rvhen Perry tells us that "good" means "being an object of desire," he also te l ls us that r , r 'e can test en'rpir ical ly whether X is good simply by determining whether i t is desired or not.13 And he also says, I f "We ought to do . . " means "We are required by society to do ," then from "Society requires that we keep promises" it follow,s that rve ought to keep promises. I t wi l l not do to reply, as some have, that no such def in i t ions are possible s ince we cannot get an Ought out of an Is, for that is to beg the quest ion. l { Hence, i t is surely reasonable to assume that both Brandt and Frankena would hold that (2) is a logical consequence of (1) . However, Frankena might not accept Brandt 's thesis that "al l problems of ethics can be solved by the methods of science,, if naturalism is true." For it seems to him that naturalistic and metaphysical definitions of ethical terms . do not suffice to solve the problem of justif ication. If we accept a certain definition of "good," or "right," then, as we saw, we will know just how to justifv judgments about what is good or r ight . But th is means that the whole burden rests on the definition, and \! 'e may stil l ask how the definition is justif ied or '"r. 'hv u'e should accept i t .15 12 lb id. , p. 178. 13 W. K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cl i f fs, N.f . : Prent ice-Hal l , 1963), p. 81. 11lbid. , p. 80. 15 Ibid. , pp. 83-84. r89 190 Lars Bergstriim But this does not mean that Frankena questions the assumption that such definitions entail or contain moral principles. On the contrary, his argument seems to rest on just this assumption. This is perhaps even more obvious when he goes on to say, When Perry tries to persuade us to accept his definition of "right," he is in eflect persuading us to accept, as a basis for action, the ethical principle that what is conducive to harmonious happiness is right. . . . He cannot establish his definition unless he can convince us of the principle. . . . In other words, to advocate the adoption of or continued adherence to a definition of an ethical or value term seems to be tantamount to trying to justify the corresponding moral principle. . . . Such definitions . . . turn out to be disguised ethical principles or value judgments which cannot themselves be deduced logically from the nature of things.16 In view of all this I am inclined to believe that many moral philosophers would maintain that definitions of ethical terms entail moral principles. At any rate, this view seems to be held by Moore, Stevenson, Ewing, Brandt, and Frankena, and these writers are all very influential. As far as I can see, however, this view is unjusti f ied. I shal l try to show that (2) is not a logical consequence of ( I ) . Similar cases may be treated in the same way. Hence, i f I am right about this, one may very well accept a given definition of an ethical term without thereby committing oneself to the acceptance of any moral principle. My argument is fairly simple, and it does not seem to involve any controversial assumptions. In part icular, i t wi l l not be based upon Hume's thesis (or upon the thesis that logical relations presuppose truth values). Neither will it be relat ive to any part icular interpretat ion of ( l) and (2). 3 What does it mean to say that X is a logical consequence of Yi In order to answer this question (which is obviously of some importance in the present context) we must distinguish between two different cases, namely: (a) the case where X and Y are sentences; and (b) the case where X and Y are statemeflts. For our purposes, the distinction between sentences and statements may be explained as fol lows. A sentence is a l inguist ic enti ty, a sequence of words, which belongs to some particular language. A statement is something that may be expressed by a sentence. It is not a linguistic entity; it does not consist of words; it is not a part of any language.lT A given sentence may be used or interpreted in many different ways. In particular, it may express different statements in different contexts or under different interpretations. Conversely, one and the same statement may be expressed by different sentences. 16Ibid. , p. 84. 17 For the dist inct ion between sentences and statements, see, e.g,, P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen & Co., 1952), pp. 3-4. Notice, however, that I am using "statement" in a fair ly wide sense here. In part icular, I include moral and normat ive statements, but I am not presupposing that such statements are true or false. Meaning and Morals Let us first consider case (b). The relation which holds between two statements p and 4 when p is a logical consequen ce of q may be defined or explained in different ways, depending upon one's choice of primitive concepts and upon the kind of problem which one is trying to answer. In this context, we may presuppose, as a primitive notion, the relation of inconsistency between statements.1S We may then define logical consequence in the following simple way: (Dl) The statement P is a logical consequence of the statement q if, and only i f , q is inconsistent with every statement which is inconsistent with p. However, this definit ion is not appl icable in case (a). I t might then be suggested that one sentence is a logical consequence of another when the statement expressed by the former is a logical consequence, in the sense of (Dl), of the statement expressed by the latter. But this wi l l not do since a sentence may (usually) be interpreted in more than one way. We might say that (D l) can be directly appl ied to sentences i f we substi tute "sentence" for "statement" throughout in my formulation of (D l), but we are then faced with the problem of what it means for two sentences to be inconsistent. A reasonable answer to this is that two sentences are inconsistent when every interpretation of them is such that the statements expressed are inconsistent. However, unless we are prepared to maintain that no pair of (dist inct) sentences is inconsistent, we must then dist inguish between what is and what is not a (permissible) interpretat ion. This is rather dif f icult , at least in the case of a natural language, but in the present context we need only give a rough and part ial characterization of the dist inct ion in question. We may conceive of an interpretat ion as a function which assigns statements to sentences in a certain way. For the sake of simplici ty I shal l require that the domain of an interpretat ion contain every sentence (of the language). I f P is a sentence and i is an interpretat ion we may use the expression ";(P)" to denote the statement which is expressed by P according to i . Indeed, given (D 1) and the notion of an interpretat ion, we may then define logical consequence between sentences as fol lows: (D 2) The sentence P is a logical consequence of the sentence Q if , and only i f , i (P) is a logical consequence of i(Q) for every interpretat ion i . But this definit ion would be much too narrow if any function from sentences to statements were an interpretat ion. There are at least two further condit ions which must be satisf ied. First, an interpretat ion must not involve any deviat ion from the standard meaning of purely logical terms l ike "not," "and," "or," " i f . . . , 18 For a discussion of inconsistenc). between statements, see, e.g., Strawson, Introduction to Logical Thcory, p. 2 fr. 191 t92 Lars Bergstrdm then . . .," and so on. Secondly, it must satisfy some consistency requirement of the following kind: it does not imply that one and the same expression has different meanings when it occurs in two different sentences. This particular consistency requirement may be somewhat too strong for natural languages,te but we need not go into this problem here. For our purposes it will suffice ro say that a given function is an interpretation if it satisfies the conditions mentioned above, but we need not exclude the possibility that some interpretation does not satisfy the last one. (I t might be held that an interpretat ion should also be 'reasonable' from the point of view of common usage. I have no objection to this requirement, but i t is usually omitted when one is interested in the purely logical relations between sentences. It seems that (D 2) would be wider or more liberal than usual if we add this requirement. Flowever, for the sake of argument I shal l not pay any attention to unreasonable interpretat ions in the sequel.) The definit ions (D 1) and (D 2) are probably not controversial. As far as I can see they are quite in accordance with the definitions which can be found in modern textbooks. For example, p is a logical consequence of 4 according to (D 1) i f , and only i f , 4 entai ls p according to P. F. Strawson's definit ion of entai lment.20 And (D 2) is very similar, in the relevant respects, to the definit ion of logical consequence which is offered by P. Suppes.zl f ,et us now return to our main or.; .rn. Is (2) a logical consequence of ( l) l I t seems that (1) and (2) may be regarded either as statements or as senrences, and I bel ieve that i t wi l l be i l luminating to dist inguish berween these two cases. I shall consider both. Suppose, f i rst, that (1) and (2) are sraremenrs. We may rhen use (D 1). I t turns out that (2) is a logical consequence of (1) only i f (1) is inconsistent with every statement that is inconsistent with (2). But i t seems clear that this condition is not satisfied. (It might be objected that (2) is a moral statement and that moral statements are not inconsistent with any statement. If this were correct, then of course the condit ion would be tr ivial ly satisf ied. But I shal l assume that moral statements can be inconsistent with some statements. This assumption is surely very reasonable.) Consider, for example, the fol lowing statement: (8) Some actions which are general ly approved are not r ight. l t seems clear that (8) is inconsistent with (2). Almost everyone would presumably agree to this. Moreover, (8) is not inconsistent with (1). In order to see this (which might be less obvious to some people) one should notice two 1e This has been pointed out to me by Mr. Bengt Hansson of the University of Lund. 20 Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, p.20. 21 P. Suppes, Introduction to Logic' (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957), p. 68; see also pp. 2l-22 and 67. Meaning and Morals things. First, ( I ) says something about the expressions "r ight" and "ge neral ly approved," but (8) does not say anything at all about these expressions. Conversely, (8) says something about act ions, but ( l) does not say anything about acrions. The two statements are about wholly dif ferent subjects. Second. ( 1) does not say anything about the expressions which occur in ( 8 ) . For, by hypothesis, (8) is a statement, and a statement does not contain or consist of any expressions at al l . In part icular, then, (1) does not say or imply that (8) is self-contradictory. At most, i t says or implies that a certain sentence cannot be used to express (8). Neither does (8) say anything about ( l) . In short, there is no relat ion between ( l) and (8) which prevents us from accepting both. We are therefore enti t led to conclude that they are consistent. Hence, i f ( l ) and (2) are statements, then, since at least one statement is inconsistent with (2) but not with (1), (2) is not a logical consequence of (1) . Let us then assume that (1) and (2) are sentences. Then, by (D 2), (2) is a logical consequence of (1) only i f every interpretat ion i (of these sentences) is such that the statement expressed bV Q) according to i is a logical consequence of the statement expressed by ( I ) according to i . But this condit ion is not satisf ied e i ther. For example, consider an interpretat ion according to which ( I ) expresses the statement that "r ight" means the same as "general ly approved" and (2) expresses the statement that i f an action is general ly approved, then i t is r ight. Such an interpretat ion does not seem unreasonable. But we have already seen that the latter statement is not a logical consequence of the former. Hence, even i f ( l ) and (2) are sentences, (2) is not a logical consequence of ( l ) . I t should be noticed that I do not want to deny that there may be some interpretat ion relat ive to which the statement expressed by (2) is a logical consequence of the statement expressed by ( 1). For example, i f ( I ) expresse s the statement that an action is r ight i f and only i f i t is general ly approved, and i f (2) expresses the statement that an action is r ight i f i t is general ly approved, then of course, with this part icular interpretat ion, the statement expressed by (2) fol lows logical ly from the statement expressed by ( l) . But (2) does not fol low from ( l ) . 5 Has something gone wrong herel Let us consider a possible objection. I t rnight be argued that (2) is analyt ic given ( l) , and that (2) must therefore be accepted by anyone who accepts ( l) . This might then be taken to show that (2) is a logical consequence of ( 1). But this argument is surely inval id. Suppose, f i rst, that ( l) and (2) are statements. In this case I would be incl ined to say that (2) cannot be analyt ic, since analyt ici ty is a property of sentences. (Note, that the usual explanations of analyt ici ty are in terms of synonym), or the meaning of expressions, or l inguist ic rules.) However, we may perhaps say that a statement can be analyt ic in the 193 t94 Lars Bergstrtim sense that i t is empty or that i t fol lows logical ly from every statement. I f (2) were analyt ic in this sense, then of course (2) would fol low quite tr ivial ly from (1);but i t does not fo l low from ( l ) that (2) is analyt ic. What fo l lows from ( l ) is rather the fol lowing statement: (9) The sentence "If an action is general ly approved, then i t is r ight" is analyt ic; but (9) is not equivalent to the statement that (2) is analyt ic. Neither is (9) equivalent to (2). I conclude that i t is not the case that (2) is analyt ic given (1) when ( l ) and (2) are statements. Secondly, suppose that ( I ) and (2) are senrences. They may then be interpreted in many dif ferent ways. On some of these interpretat ions (1) does indeed express a statement from which i t fol lows that (2) is analyt ic. See, for example, the f irst interpretat ion mentioned in section 4. But on other interpretations ( I ) does not express such a statement. For example, see the last interpretat ion mentioned in section 4. Hence, the sentence (1) does not by i tself entai l or enti t le us to conclude that (2) is analyt ic. However, it might be held that there is something odd about those interpretations according to which ( 1) expresses a statement from which it follows rhat (2) is analyt ic and (2) expresses a nonrmpty statement which does nor fol low from the statement expressed by ( l) . I have used an interpretat ion of this kind in order to show that (2) does not fol low from (1) i f (1) and (2) are senrences; it might now be objected that such interpretations are inconsistent since, roughly speaking, they imply that (2) is both analyt ic and synthetic. As far as I can see, however, this objection is mistaken. Interpretat ions of this kind need not violate the consistency requirement indicated above (section 3). In part icular, they do not imply that "r ight" and "general ly approved" have one meaning in ( l ) and another in (2), for these terms do not occur in ( l ) at a l l . What occurs in ( I ) is rather " ' r ight ' " and " 'general ly approved. ' " (These lat ter terms may reasonably be taken to denote or refer to "r ight" and "general ly approved," respectively, but that is irrelevant here.) Moreover, i t seems clear that we may propose or accept a certain interpretation of a given sentence without accepting the statement which is expressed by the sentence according to rhis interpretat ion. In part icular, we may very well assign a statement to (1) from which i t fol lows that (2) is analyt ic, without thereby committ ing ourselves ro rhe view that (2) is analyt ic; hence, such an interpretat ion may consistently assign a non-empty statement to (2) which does not fol low from the sraremenr expressed by ( 1). As a matter of fact, i t seems correct to say that (2) is analyt ic given (1) only i f ( l ) is a statement and (2) is a senrence. But (2) is apparently not a logical consequence of (1) in this case either-at least not in any ordinary sense. As far as I know, logical consequence is never conceived of as a relat ion between statements on the one hand and sentences on the other. Neither does i t seem reasonable, even in this case, to maintain that one has to accept (2) i f one Meaning and Morals 195 accepts (1). In part icular, what does i t mean to'accept 'a sentencel Of course, i f " to accept (2)" is now taken to mean the same as "to accept the statement that (2) is analyt ic," then I have no objection, but this is surely a very pecul iar use of "accept." In short, there seems to be no reason for rejecting my earlier conclusion that (2) does not fol low from (1). Moreover, since my argument caneasi ly be adapted to similar cases, we may also conclude that no definition of an ethical term entails or conrains any moral principle. Some readers may find this trivial, but we have also seen rhat several moral philosophers appear to hold the opposite view.